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COMMENTS
ATTEMPTING—AND FAILING—TO BALANCE
FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY IN THE
ARBITRAL SYSTEM: HOW ARBITRATION




The Supreme Court has actively expanded the Federal Arbitration Act into
realms not originally contemplated by Congress. This harms consumers who
are parties to pre-dispute, binding arbitration agreements. If consumers sign a
contract containing an arbitration agreement, they may be required to arbi-
trate everything within the agreement’s scope, including their statutory rights.
Simultaneously, the Court has restricted class action arbitration—a device on
which consumers have relied when they are forced to arbitrate.
The Court’s expansion of arbitration and restriction of class action arbitra-
tion has led many to distrust and advocate for changing the arbitral system.
Arbitration institutions have directly reacted to the concerns about arbitration
by promulgating more rules, procedures, and safeguards to make arbitration
fairer for consumers. However, adding rules and procedures is probably not
enough to make arbitration proceedings truly fair, and doing so creates a sys-
tem that is so court-like that arbitration loses its chief benefits—affordability
and efficiency. Thus, if the Court continues with its expansive arbitration juris-
prudence and its anti-class action arbitration jurisprudence, institutional reac-
tion is an unlikely solution to address arbitration’s fairness concerns.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is a dispute resolution method deeply ingrained in the
U.S. legal system. However, resolving disputes through arbitration is
not without controversy. While arbitration’s proponents champion it
as a much cheaper, quicker, and overall more efficient alternative to
litigation, arbitration’s opponents criticize its unfairness, particularly
when it is used to resolve disputes between service providers and con-
sumers. Much criticism surrounding arbitration’s unfairness arises
from the United States Supreme Court’s expansion and contradictory
treatment of arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).1
Congress passed the FAA to compel hostile federal courts to en-
force agreements to arbitrate contractual disputes arising between
commercial entities.2 Despite the FAA’s narrow purpose, the Su-
preme Court has interpreted the FAA broadly, expanding its applica-
tion to both federal and state courts3 and both contractual and
statutory claims.4 Through this expansive interpretation, the Court has
asserted a clear policy favoring arbitration.5 However, the Court’s
willingness to liberally construe the FAA screeches to a halt in one
particular context—class action arbitration. This jurisprudence is con-
tradictory given the Court’s generally favorable view of arbitration
and is problematic because class actions are “often the only practical
way for individuals to challenge corporations.”6
The Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion—one
of the first cases in which the Court directly addressed class action
arbitration—highlights the Court’s inconsistent treatment.7 The Con-
cepcions were among the plaintiffs bringing a class action lawsuit
1. See Margaret L. Moses, How the Supreme Court’s Misconstruction of the FAA
Has Affected Consumers, 30 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 1 (2017); see also Jill I.
Gross, Justice Scalia’s Hat Trick and the Supreme Court’s Flawed Understanding of
Twenty-First Century Arbitration, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 111, 147 (2015).
2. Moses, supra note 1, at 1–2.
3. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
4. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
625–27 (1985).
5. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
6. Editorial Board, Arbitrating Disputes, Denying Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/08/opinion/sunday/arbitrating-disputes-deny-
ing-justice.html [https://perma.cc/H4EB-U4AH].
7. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
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against AT&T for fraud.8 They claimed that AT&T had promised
them a free phone but instead had charged them $30.22.9 Although
the Concepcions had signed an arbitration agreement prohibiting the
use of class-wide proceedings, they argued under California law that
consumer contracts containing class waivers were unconscionable and
thus unenforceable.10 The Court upheld the arbitration agreement’s
validity, concluding that the FAA preempted California law,11 be-
cause the rule “disfavor[ed] arbitration.”12 Dissenting, Justice Breyer
recognized the negative impact the decision would have on consumers
seeking to bring claims against service providers, noting that “[t]he
realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits,
but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”13
The Court’s treatment of class action arbitration, and thus con-
sumer arbitration, raises the questions of whether the Court has ap-
propriately expanded the FAA and restricted class action arbitration
and whether arbitration should remain a viable method of dispute res-
olution. But despite the outcry regarding arbitration’s unfairness, it is
highly unlikely that the Court will overturn decades of its arbitration
precedent. Further, the reality is that resolving disputes through arbi-
tration is not ending any time soon. As a result, this Comment as-
sumes that the Court will continue expanding arbitration and limiting
class action arbitration. Rather, this Comment shifts its focus away
from the Court’s jurisprudence and centers its analysis on the entities
that have largely been ignored when it comes to addressing arbitra-
tion’s fairness—arbitration institutions. In doing so, this Comment
shows that arbitration institutions have directly reacted to concerns
raised by anti-arbitration and consumer advocates regarding the fair-
ness of the Court’s jurisprudence.
It makes sense that arbitration institutions closely monitor these
concerns: arbitration institutions have a clear interest in maintaining
arbitration’s viability and popularity. However, these interests often
conflict; appropriately addressing arbitration’s fairness concerns man-
dates that arbitration institutions promulgate more rules and proce-
dures for consumer arbitrations. The unintended effect is that
arbitration is becoming so litigation- and court-like that it is losing its
chief benefits—the quick and inexpensive resolution of disputes.14
Thus, while arbitration institutions attempt to balance the disparity
between fairness and efficiency, the consequences are not desirable
for either side of the arbitration debate. Ultimately, institutional reac-
8. Id. at 337.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 337–38.
11. Id. at 352.
12. Id. at 341.
13. Id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc.,
376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)).
14. See id. at 348 (majority opinion).
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tion is likely insufficient to address the fairness problems present in
arbitration agreements between consumers and service providers
while simultaneously keeping arbitration quick and inexpensive.
Part II addresses the current legal landscape and its development,
including the FAA’s historical background, the Supreme Court’s ex-
pansion of the FAA, and the Court’s restriction of class action arbitra-
tion. This Part also explains the disproportionate and negative impact
the Court’s jurisprudence has on consumers. Lastly, this Part high-
lights concerns about arbitration’s fairness by examining cases in
which courts have carved out ways to invalidate otherwise impenetra-
ble arbitration agreements. Part III analyzes the institutional reaction
to these concerns, with a focus on the American Arbitration Associa-
tion. Finally, Part IV concludes with a discussion on the implications
of institutional reaction and considers what solutions, if any, can make
arbitration fairer without defeating its purpose.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
To understand how arbitration institutions’ actions may not success-
fully balance fairness and efficiency concerns, it is first essential to
understand the ways in which the FAA’s original purpose has been
interpreted, how the Supreme Court has expanded the FAA, and the
impact this expansion has had on consumers.
A. The FAA’s Original Purpose
Before Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, federal courts were re-
luctant to enforce arbitration agreements.15 Courts were hostile to the
idea that parties could “contract out of public litigation and enforce
their legal rights without the assurances and protections of a jury sys-
tem.”16 Even so, arbitration agreements remained popular among
commercial entities.17 Utilizing arbitration to resolve disputes allowed
businesses to quickly and efficiently resolve conflicts, keep costs low,
and maintain cordial business relationships.18 Further, businesses
could select an arbitrator based on the arbitrator’s expertise in a given
business field as opposed to submitting their dispute to a judge, who
may be unfamiliar with the intricacies of that field.19 Recognizing arbi-
tration’s benefits within the commercial context, Congress enacted the
15. Salvatore U. Bonaccorso, Note, State Court Resistance to Federal Arbitration
Law, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1145, 1146 (2015).
16. Id.
17. See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 850
(1961).
18. See Moses, supra note 1, at 1.
19. KATHERINE V.W. STONE ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW 34 (3d ed. 2014) (quoting
Julius Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV.
265 (1926)).
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FAA,20 with § 2 establishing the enforceability of arbitration
agreements:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . .
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.21
Section 2 curbs judicial hostility toward arbitration by ensuring that
judges enforce valid arbitration agreements as they would any other
contract.22 Accordingly, § 2 provides that only state-law contract de-
fenses may invalidate arbitration agreements.23 Other FAA sections
require federal courts to grant a stay of litigation and compel arbitra-
tion if one party refuses to abide by a valid arbitration agreement.24
Another section mandates that an arbitrator’s award is final and bind-
ing and can only be overturned in limited circumstances.25
The FAA’s legislative history reveals what Congress viewed as the
Act’s fundamental aspects. Julius Cohen, one of the FAA’s chief
drafters, emphasized that arbitration under the Act was “entirely vol-
untary,” suited for “ordinary disputes between merchants,” and im-
proper for deciding complex constitutional or statutory issues.26 In the
congressional debates surrounding the FAA’s passage, senators sup-
porting the Act assured their skeptical colleagues that the FAA would
only apply to merchant contracts involving the transaction of goods
and not to adhesion contracts.27
20. The FAA’s purpose was to cure the “evils” that arise in commercial litigation,
including:
(1) The long delay usually incident to a proceeding at law . . . , especially in
recent years in centers of commercial activity . . . . (2) The expense of litiga-
tion. (3) The failure, through litigation, to reach a decision regarded as just
when measured by the standards of the business world. This failure may re-
sult either because the courts necessarily apply general rules which do not
always fit a specific case, or because . . . the parties do not have the benefit of
the judgment of persons familiar with the peculiarities of the given
controversy.
Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L.
REV. 265, 269 (1926).
21. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Id. §§ 3–4.
25. See id. § 10.
26. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 279, 281.
27. In the congressional debates surrounding the passage of the FAA:
Concern was expressed by senators about whether the statute could be ap-
plied to adhesion contracts. When Senator Walsh of Montana asked if the
legislation would apply to contracts that were not truly voluntary, he was
assured by the supporters that the Act would only apply to “a contract be-
tween merchants one with another, buying and selling goods.” Representa-
tive Graham noted in the 1924 House floor debate that the bill “provides for
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After the FAA’s enactment, arbitration remained the dispute reso-
lution method of choice among commercial entities.28 It also grew in
popularity among the judiciary as federal courts recognized their duty
to end hostility toward arbitration.29 Acknowledging Congress’s intent
in enacting the FAA, federal courts treated arbitration agreements
like other contracts30 and enforced them according to their terms.31
Notably, in the first few decades following the FAA’s enactment,
courts declined to compel arbitration of federal statutory claims.32 At
that time, courts reasoned that “these important matters did not be-
long in a venue that features narrow appellate review and idiosyn-
cratic procedural and evidentiary standards.”33 Meanwhile, many state
legislatures continued viewing arbitration with suspicion and passed
laws exempting certain claims relating to consumer or employee dis-
putes from arbitration.34
Despite the federal judiciary and state legislatures initially limiting
the FAA’s scope, the FAA now applies broadly and thus differs dras-
tically from Congress’s original intent. While the FAA was designed
as a strictly procedural tool, it can now apply substantively.35 This
means that the FAA can apply in both state and federal courts and
preempt contrary state law, which interferes with a state’s power to
limit the arbitrability of certain claims.36 Additionally, commercial en-
tities are no longer alone in their use of arbitration agreements, as
today arbitration clauses are present in almost every type of agree-
ment, including in contracts between those with unequal bargaining
power.37 Lastly, despite the Court’s initial hesitation to allow arbitrat-
one thing . . . to give an opportunity to enforce . . . an agreement to arbitrate
when voluntarily placed in the document by the parties to it.”
Moses, supra note 1, at 3.
28. See Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving
Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in Fortune
1000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2014) (stating that “[f]or much
of the latter half of the twentieth century, out-of-court dispute resolution centered on
binding arbitration as an alternative to litigation of commercial disputes”).
29. Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir.
1942) (recognizing that “[i]n the light of the clear intention of Congress, it is our
obligation to shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration”).
30. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443–44 (2006).
31. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 478 (1989).
32. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
33. David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Em-
pirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 65 (2015) [hereinafter After
the Revolution].
34. Id.
35. Moses, supra note 1, at 4.
36. See id. at 4–5; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15–16, 16 n.10 (1984).
37. See Robert Gebeloff & Karl Russell, Removing the Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/30/business/dealbook/ar-
bitration-trends.html [https://perma.cc/3SPW-L6RB].
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ing statutory claims, important and complicated statutory rights are
now subject to arbitration under the FAA.38
B. The Supreme Court’s Expansion of the FAA
The FAA’s expanded scope is the direct result of the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the statute.39 Although the FAA was rela-
tively untouched in the decades following its enactment,40 the Court
began drastically expanding the FAA’s scope in the 1980s and, in do-
ing so, abandoned any residual judicial hostility toward arbitration.41
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,
the Court for the first time declared that § 2 of the FAA was substan-
tive law and asserted that the FAA was “a congressional declaration
of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwith-
standing any state substantive or procedural policies to the con-
trary.”42 Upon this premise, the Court held that “any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor
of arbitration.”43
This holding elevated arbitration as the Court’s dispute resolution
mechanism of choice and contradicted Congress’s intent that the
FAA’s application be voluntary in nature because even if the parties’
intent is unclear, a court can still compel arbitration.44 Resolving cases
of doubt regarding the parties’ intent in favor of arbitration also con-
tradicts Congress’s intent to place these agreements on “the same
footing as other contracts.”45 Nevertheless, Moses H. Cone became
the Court’s basis for expanding the FAA “beyond any conception of
the drafters or the 1925 Congress.”46
The Court’s declaration that § 2 was substantive law meant that the
FAA could apply in state courts and preempt contrary state law.47 The
Court reiterated this concept in Southland Corp. v. Keating, holding
that “[i]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national
policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to
require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the con-
tracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”48 While the Court
noted that state-law contract defenses could still invalidate an arbitra-
38. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640
(1985).
39. Gross, supra note 1, at 124.
40. After the Revolution, supra note 33, at 59.
41. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
42. Id. at 24.
43. Id. at 24–25.
44. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 20, at 279.
45. See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924). “The existence of a contract depends . . .
on the parties’ intent to be bound.” Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA. L. REV.
1437, 1437 (2009).
46. Moses, supra note 1, at 8–9.
47. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24, 25 n.32.
48. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
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tion agreement,49 only general defenses applicable to all contracts
could work.50 Because arbitration agreements were to be placed on
equal footing with other contracts,51 they could not be invalidated by
contract defenses appearing to single out52 or disproportionately af-
fect arbitration.53 Thus, a substantive interpretation of § 2 restricts a
state’s power to protect its citizens from arbitration agreements made
with unequal bargaining power, as many states had attempted to do
following the FAA’s passage.54
Additionally, statutory claims are now arbitrable under the FAA.55
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the
Court reaffirmed that the FAA “create[d] a body of federal substan-
tive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to
arbitrate.”56 Drawing upon this principle, parties could arbitrate statu-
tory claims if the claims fell within the scope of the parties’ arbitration
agreement.57 The Court applied Moses H. Cone in concluding that
parties’ intentions regarding the scope of arbitrable issues should be
“generously construed.”58 Importantly, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that statutory claims were too complex for arbitration (and in
doing so ignored early interpretations of the statute by the FAA draft-
ers59), noting that “adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks
of arbitration.”60
The Court clarified that parties did not “forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute” by submitting statutory claims to arbitration
because arbitration was simply a change in forum.61 Thus, if a statu-
49. See id. at 10–11 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
50. Id. at 16 n.11.
51. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974).
52. Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 684, 687 (1996) (holding that the
FAA preempted a Montana law requiring arbitration clauses to “be typed in under-
lined capital letters on the first page of the contract”).
53. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341–43 (2011).
54. After the Revolution, supra note 33, at 65.
55. Id. at 67.
56. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625
(1985) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25
n.32 (1983)).
57. Id. at 625–26. In holding this, the Court cited a recent case in which the Court
held that “‘[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce
private agreements into which parties had entered,’ a concern which ‘requires that we
rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.’” Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
58. Id. at 626.
59. See Moses, supra note 1, at 4.
60. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 633. The Court also emphasized this view
in later cases regarding the arbitrability of statutory rights, including that the “Arbi-
tration Act requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable
claims . . . even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of
separate proceedings in different forums.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213, 217 (1985).
61. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628.
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tory claim fell within the agreement’s scope, the claim was arbitrable
as long as a party could “effectively . . . vindicate” his or her statutory
rights in arbitration.62
By asserting such a clear policy favoring arbitration, the Court has
shown it is more than willing to expand arbitration in ways not origi-
nally contemplated by Congress—even if there is doubt as to the par-
ties’ intent; even if the process is slower, costlier, or inefficient; and
even if a claim involves highly complex issues. In other words, the
Court condones arbitration even when doing so would frustrate the
very purposes behind the FAA’s enactment.
C. The Supreme Court’s Restriction of Class Action Arbitration
Despite the Court’s willingness to expand arbitration in various
contexts, the Court has gone out of its way to restrict one particular
form of arbitration—class action arbitration.
The Court first implicitly affirmed class action arbitration’s plausi-
bility in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, when the Court consid-
ered whether an agreement to arbitrate “all contract-related disputes”
could be interpreted as allowing a party to proceed through arbitra-
tion as part of a class, even when the agreement was otherwise silent
on the availability of class action arbitration.63 In that case, Burt and
Lynn Bazzle had executed a home-improvement loan with Green Tree
Financial Corporation (“Green Tree”).64 When a dispute arose, the
Bazzles and other similarly situated consumers filed actions in South
Carolina state court, seeking class certification.65 Citing the arbitra-
tion clause, Green Tree motioned to stay proceedings and compel ar-
bitration.66 The South Carolina trial court granted Green Tree’s
motions but allowed the case to proceed as a class action.67 The arbi-
trator issued an award favoring the class, and the South Carolina trial
court confirmed the award.68 Green Tree appealed, claiming that class
arbitration was “legally impermissible.”69 However, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court disagreed and held that the proceeding was per-
missible because state law construed arbitration agreements that were
silent on the issue as allowing class arbitration.70
62. Id. at 637. While effective vindication seems like a safeguard, the Court con-
strues effective vindication of statutory rights narrowly to simply mean “the right to
pursue” a federal statutory claim. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S.
228, 236–37 (2013).
63. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003) (plurality opinion).
64. Id. at 447–48.
65. Id. at 448–49.




70. Id. at 447.
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On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, four justices con-
cluded—in a plurality decision—that whether or not the arbitration
agreement permitted class arbitration was a procedural issue for the
arbitrator to decide.71 The parties had agreed to submit all contract-
related disputes to an arbitrator, and the class action question in this
case was a dispute relating to the contract.72
Although Bazzle indicated class action arbitration was possible,
later Supreme Court decisions reveal the Court’s hostility toward the
idea. In Concepcion, the issue was whether the FAA preempted a Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court decision that made contracts containing class
action waivers unconscionable.73 AT&T and the Concepcions had en-
tered into an agreement for a free phone.74 The agreement contained
an arbitration clause stating that claims could be brought solely on an
individual basis.75 A dispute arose when AT&T charged the Concep-
cions $30.22 in taxes.76 Alleging fraud, the Concepcions filed a com-
plaint that was later certified as a class action, notwithstanding the
clause’s terms.77 When AT&T moved to compel arbitration, the Con-
cepcions argued “that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable
and unlawfully exculpatory under California law because it disallowed
classwide procedures.”78 The district court and the Ninth Circuit
agreed,79 holding that the class action waiver was unenforceable.80
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that California law was in-
consistent with the FAA.81 While the Concepcions had attempted to
invalidate the agreement by using a general state-law contract defense
(unconscionability), the defense “applied in a fashion that disfavor[ed]
arbitration.”82 This was “an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” in enacting the
FAA.83 Thus, if a party wanted to invalidate an arbitration agreement
based on a general state-law contract defense, he or she would have to
apply the defense and then show that its application did not disfavor
arbitration.84
71. Id. at 447, 451–52.
72. Id. at 451–52 (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943
(1995) (holding that arbitration is a “matter of contract”)).
73. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011).
74. Id. at 336–37.
75. Id. at 336.
76. Id. at 337.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 337–38.
79. Id. at 338.
80. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255,
at *14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 584
F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333 (2011).
81. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348, 352.
82. Id. at 341.
83. Id. at 352 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
84. See id.
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Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, took Concepcion as an op-
portunity to dive into all the problems he believed class arbitration
presented. According to Scalia, class arbitration was overall inconsis-
tent with the arbitral system85 because “[a] prime objective of an
agreement to arbitrate is to achieve ‘streamlined proceedings and ex-
peditious results.’”86 Class arbitration “makes the process slower,
more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass” than bi-
lateral arbitration.87 To demonstrate this, Scalia pointed to the class
action arbitration procedures, noting their similarity to the class action
litigation procedures outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“FRCP”).88
Class action arbitration was also problematic because it “include[d]
absent parties, necessitating additional and different procedures and
involving higher stakes.”89 For example, absent parties would be
bound by the arbitrator’s decision, presenting fairness concerns.90 Ab-
sent parties also made confidentiality—another benefit of arbitra-
tion—more difficult.91
Additionally, Scalia was skeptical that arbitrators were qualified to
decide the class-certification question, stating that “while it is theoreti-
cally possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise relevant to
the class-certification question, arbitrators are not generally knowl-
edgeable” on the issue.92 Lastly, Scalia addressed the risk class arbi-
tration posed to defendants.93 Because it required that several claims
be “aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error [would] often
become unacceptable,” especially due to the limited grounds available
to appeal an arbitrator’s award.94 The risk that an arbitrator could
wrongly decide several claims against a defendant would therefore
pressure defendants “into settling questionable claims.”95
Beyond upholding class action waivers’ validity, the Court has built
upon Concepcion and held that parties can only arbitrate on a class-
wide basis if the agreement explicitly states that class-wide relief is
available.96 In Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, employee Frank Varela
sued employer Lamps Plus in federal district court.97 The district court
85. Id. at 348–49 (explaining that “class arbitration was not even envisioned by
Congress when it passed the FAA in 1925”).
86. Id. at 346 (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357–58 (2008)).
87. Id. at 348.
88. Id. at 349.
89. Id. at 347–48.
90. See id. at 348–49.
91. Id. at 348.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 350–51.
94. Id.; 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (listing the four permissible grounds for vacating an arbi-
tral award).
95. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350.
96. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416–17 (2019).
97. Id. at 1413.
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granted Lamps Plus’s motion to compel arbitration but allowed
Varela’s case to proceed as part of a class.98 The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, holding that the arbitration agreement was ambiguous on the
availability of class-wide relief.99 Because the agreement was ambigu-
ous, the Ninth Circuit applied a California law that construed ambigu-
ity against the drafter, noting that the rule especially applied in
matters involving adhesion contracts.100 Because Lamps Plus was the
drafter, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the arbitration agreement as
permitting class arbitration.101
Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court reversed.102 Building upon its
unfavorable view of the device, the Court explained that class arbitra-
tion “sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informal-
ity—and makes the process slower [and] more costly.”103 Because of
the “‘crucial differences’ between individual and class arbitration,”
there was “reason to doubt the parties’ mutual consent to resolve dis-
putes through classwide arbitration.”104 Accordingly, “ambiguity d[id]
not provide a sufficient basis to conclude that parties to an arbitration
agreement agreed to ‘sacrifice[] the principal advantage of arbitra-
tion.’”105 Because California law allowed parties to arbitrate on a
class-wide basis even if the agreement did not explicitly state class-
wide relief was available, California law required that the parties arbi-
trate in a manner to which the parties did not agree.106 Therefore, the
FAA preempted California law, and Varela could not arbitrate as a
class member.107
D. Contradictory and Problematic Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The Court’s expansion of the FAA and simultaneous restriction of
class action arbitration is both contradictory and problematic. It is
contradictory for several reasons. First, the Court has established a
clear preference for arbitration over litigation even if it is slower, cost-
lier, or inefficient.108 For example, parties can arbitrate statutory
claims despite the claims’ complexity109 and “even where the result
98. Id. (summarizing the district court’s order).
99. Id. (summarizing the Ninth Circuit’s holding).
100. Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 701 F. App’x 670, 672 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Sand-
quist v. Lebo Auto, Inc., 376 P.3d 506, 514 (Cal. 2016)), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
101. Id. at 673.
102. Lamps Plus, Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1419.
103. Id. at 1416 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348
(2011)).
104. Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662,
685–87 (2010)).
105. Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011)).
106. Id. at 1416–18.
107. Id. at 1419.
108. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
633–34 (1985).
109. See id.
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would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings
in different forums.”110 Thus, the Court will readily forfeit efficiency
in favor of sending a dispute to arbitration. Yet the Court cites class
action arbitration’s slowness, costliness, and formality as primary rea-
sons why class action arbitration is inconsistent with the FAA.111
Second, the Court has held that when an arbitration agreement is
valid, it is the arbitrator’s job—not a court’s—to determine procedu-
ral issues.112 Although litigants still debate whether the ability to bring
a claim on a class-wide basis is a procedural issue for an arbitrator to
decide,113 the Court has stated (albeit in a plurality decision) that it
is.114 Even if the class-wide relief question is not procedural, the Court
has affirmed that an arbitration agreement leaving doubt regarding
the scope of arbitrable issues should be interpreted with a strong pref-
erence toward arbitrability.115 Therefore, Court precedent would nat-
urally lead one to conclude that any question regarding whether an
arbitration agreement permits class-wide relief should be construed as
permitting class action arbitration. Instead, the Court has held that if
an agreement is silent or ambiguous on the issue, the agreement
should be construed against allowing class action arbitration.116 In so
holding, the Court required a heightened version of consent for class
arbitration agreements117 and placed arbitration on unequal footing
with other contracts, frustrating a purpose of the FAA.118
Lastly, “it is well established that the FAA’s fundamental underly-
ing policy . . . is a preference for permitting parties to design the [alter-
110. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985).
111. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011).
112. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84–85 (2002) (explaining
that procedural issues are for the arbitrator to decide).
113. There is currently a circuit split over whether the issue of class-wide arbitra-
tion is a procedural question. Liz Kramer, Circuit Split Deepens over Whether Arbitra-
tors Should Decide Availability of Class Action, ARB. NATION (Aug. 26, 2018), https://
www.arbitrationnation.com/circuit-split-deepens-whether-arbitrators-decide-availa-
bility-class-action/ [https://perma.cc/W57T-2RDU].
114. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451–52 (2003) (plurality opin-
ion) (stating that the ability to bring a claim on a class-wide basis is a question of
procedure for the arbitrator to decide).
115. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24–25 (1983); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
626 (1985).
116. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416–17 (2019).
117. In Lamps Plus, see id. at 1416, and Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687 (2010), the Court refused to hold that the parties agreed to
arbitrate on a class-wide basis simply because the Court thought it was unlikely that
parties would consent to class action arbitration given the fundamental differences
between bilateral and class arbitration.
118. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (noting that, in passing the FAA, Congress
intended that arbitration agreements be “placed upon the same footing” as any
contract).
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native dispute resolution] mechanism of their choosing.”119 Courts
should not decide that the parties’ choice, which could very well be
class arbitration, is invalid because it takes too long or costs too much.
Therefore, the Court’s hostility toward class arbitration could frus-
trate another purpose of the FAA, which is to honor the parties’
intentions.120
The Court’s jurisprudence is also problematic in that it dispropor-
tionately and negatively impacts consumers. After the Court ex-
panded the FAA in the 1980s, arbitration exploded in popularity
among employers and service providers.121 Most arbitration agree-
ments between consumers and service providers are placed in “adhe-
sion contracts,”122 in which one party has essentially no bargaining
power and might not even realize that, by signing the contract, he or
she is consenting to mandatory, binding arbitration.123
The Court’s decision that the FAA applies in state court and can
preempt state law restricts a state’s ability to protect consumers from
arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts in two ways. First, the
FAA preempts state laws that appear to single out arbitration agree-
ments, even if the law’s purpose is simply to apprise consumers that
they are signing a contract containing an arbitration agreement.124 For
example, the FAA preempted a state law merely requiring that arbi-
tration agreements be typed and underlined.125 Second, even if a state
law appears generally applicable to all contracts, the FAA still
preempts that law if it disproportionately affects arbitration.126
It is also concerning that a party to an adhesion contract may be
forced to arbitrate his or her statutory rights. Although statutory
claims are only arbitrable if a party can “effectively vindicate” his or
her rights in the arbitral forum, “effective vindication” means only
“‘the right to pursue’ a federal statutory right.”127 Given this narrow
interpretation, it is unsurprising that courts have rarely applied the
119. Neal Troum, The Problem with Class Arbitration, 38 VT. L. REV. 419, 428
(2013).
120. Id.
121. Katherine V.W. Stone, Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation
and Arbitration of Employment Rights, 61 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 164, 167
(2013).
122. In Concepcion, Justice Scalia noted that “the times in which consumer con-
tracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346–47 (2011).
123. Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Con-
sumer Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV.
1191, 1192 (2001).
124. See Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683, 687 (1996).
125. See id. at 684, 688.
126. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341–43 (2011).
127. Colby J. Byrd, Note, Vindicating the Effective Vindication Exception: Protect-
ing Federal Statutory Rights in the Employment Context, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 761, 762
(2018) (citing Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 236 (2013)).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-3\TWL303.txt unknown Seq: 15 19-APR-21 10:04
2021] BALANCE FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY 597
“effective vindication” exception to invalidate an arbitration
agreement.128
Lastly, even if a consumer knows the contract contains an arbitra-
tion clause, a consumer cannot bargain over adhesion contract terms.
Minimal bargaining power calls into question the fairness of the terms
that prescribe how the parties would proceed through arbitration
should a dispute arise.
While the Court’s expansion of the FAA alone raises fairness con-
cerns, the Court’s restriction of class action arbitration and approval
of class action waivers makes it even more difficult for consumers to
bring claims against service providers. Because it is unlikely that plain-
tiffs would pursue low-value claims that they would otherwise pursue
as class members, class arbitration waivers function like a “get out of
jail free card” for defendants.129 Further, service providers prefer to
arbitrate cases on an individual basis because they are likely to be
“repeat players” in the arbitral system, which allows them to
“stockpil[e] information” and “cultivat[e] relationships” with arbitra-
tion institutions.130 Service-provider experience puts consumers at an
obvious disadvantage and increases the risk that an arbitrator may
favor a service provider.
E. Carving Out Exceptions: Attacking the Validity of Arbitration
Agreements
The Court’s expansion of the FAA and the resulting negative ef-
fects on consumers led anti-arbitration and consumer advocates to
voice their concerns over both the lack of protection consumers re-
ceive when entering arbitration agreements and the lack of fair proce-
dures for consumers once forced to arbitrate. In light of these
concerns, there are scenarios in which courts will invalidate allegedly
unfair arbitration agreements.
First, arbitration agreements (particularly those in adhesion con-
tracts) may prohibit plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their statu-
tory rights in the arbitral forum.131 An often-targeted provision is one
that details arbitration costs and, specifically, how parties will split
those costs.132 Anti-arbitration and consumer advocates argue that
provisions requiring consumers to bear excessive costs prevent them
from bringing claims.133 If excessive costs prevent a consumer from
128. See id. at 766.
129. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
130. After the Revolution, supra note 33, at 68.
131. Amalia D. Kessler, Arbitration & Americanization: The Paternalism of Pro-
gressive Procedural Reform, 124 YALE L.J. 2940, 2943 (2015) (“Opponents argue, by
contrast, that consumers and employees forced into binding, mandatory arbitration
are denied the procedural tools required for meaningful vindication of their rights.”).
132. See After the Revolution, supra note 33, at 71.
133. See id.
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bringing a statutory claim, a consumer is essentially forfeiting his or
her right to pursue that claim. In that circumstance, arbitration would
not simply be a change in forum, and courts would not require a con-
sumer to arbitrate.134 The Supreme Court case Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Randolph portrays this argument.135
In Randolph, a consumer sued a service provider alleging that the
service provider violated the Truth in Lending Act and the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act.136 Under an arbitration clause, the service
provider motioned to compel arbitration.137 The consumer argued,
however, that she “lacked the resources to arbitrate”138 and that the
risk of substantial arbitration costs made her “unable to vindicate her
statutory rights.”139 The Court considered whether the arbitration
agreement, which was silent on costs, gave the consumer enough pro-
tection from the possibly expensive costs of presenting her federal-law
claims in arbitration.140 The Court conceded that “the existence of
large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively
vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”141 How-
ever, in this case, the record did not contain sufficient evidence that
the consumer would bear prohibitive costs.142 Thus, the risk the con-
sumer faced was too speculative to justify invalidating the arbitration
agreement.143
Courts have continued evaluating this issue on a case-by-case ba-
sis.144 In Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., a plaintiff argued that
the cost-splitting provisions in an arbitration agreement denied her
the ability to effectively vindicate her statutory rights.145 Although
under the agreement the defendant would initially pay all arbitration
costs, the parties would split fees once the arbitrator issued an
award.146 And the arbitrator could require the losing party to pay all
the arbitration costs.147
134. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) (holding that submitting statutory claims to arbitration was simply a change in
forum and, in doing so, parties did not “forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute”).
135. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
136. Id. at 83.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 83–84.
139. Id. at 90.
140. Id. at 89.
141. Id. at 90.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 91.
144. The Court has “adopted a case-by-case approach to determining whether a
cost-splitting provision in an arbitration agreement denies potential litigants the op-
portunity to vindicate their statutory rights.” Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317
F.3d 646, 659 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
145. Id. at 657–58.
146. Id. at 654–55.
147. Id. at 655.
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The Sixth Circuit invalidated the cost-splitting provision because it
would “deter a substantial number of . . . similarly situated” plaintiffs
“from seeking to vindicate their statutory claims.”148 Under the provi-
sion, the costs of arbitrating the dispute could far exceed the costs that
the plaintiff would incur in litigation.149 The court noted that while
“[c]ourts charge plaintiffs initial filing fees, . . . they do not charge
extra for in-person hearings, discovery requests, routine motions, or
written decisions, costs that are all common in the world of private
arbitrators.”150 Further, the overall costs for the plaintiff’s claim could
possibly range from “three to nearly fifty times the basic costs of liti-
gating in a judicial . . . forum.”151 That was enough to show that the
plaintiff would bear prohibitive costs and to invalidate the cost-split-
ting provision.152
Another potential defense to enforcing an arbitration agreement is
unfairness in the arbitration proceeding itself. “An arbitral forum
need not replicate the judicial forum” in its entirety.153 In fact, it is not
desirable that an arbitral forum do so because arbitration should in
theory be less costly and more efficient than litigation. However, arbi-
tration proceedings should at a minimum be fair and neutral.154 An
arbitration agreement’s provisions often predetermine a proceeding’s
fairness.155 In Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, the agreement re-
quired the plaintiff to provide a witness list while the defendant did
not have the same obligation.156 Also, the arbitrator could only be
selected from a list that the defendant created.157 Lastly, the defen-
dant had the right to modify the procedure at any time.158 The Fourth
Circuit held that the agreement’s terms were so “egregiously unfair”
and “one-sided” that the defendant had “undermine[d] the neutrality
of the proceeding.”159 Thus, the arbitration agreement was uncon-
scionable and unenforceable.160
Similarly, courts have invalidated an arbitration agreement when it
limits discovery.161 In Ostroff v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., the plaintiff
could only depose the defendant’s expert witness and not any fact wit-
148. Id. at 668–69.
149. Id. at 669.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 670.
153. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999).
154. Id. If an arbitration proceeding does not meet these minimum standards of
fairness, it constitutes a ground for vacating an arbitral award under § 10 of the FAA.
See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2).
155. Hooters of Am., Inc., 173 F.3d at 938–40.
156. Id. at 938.
157. Id. at 938–39.
158. Id. at 939.
159. Id. at 938.
160. Id. at 940–41.
161. See, e.g., Ostroff v. Alterra Healthcare Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 538, 545 (E.D.
Pa. 2006).
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nesses.162 The court found that this discovery limitation was severe
enough to deny the plaintiff “a fair opportunity to present [her]
claims”163 and held that the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable.164
Lastly, arbitration proceedings are unfair when the agreement pro-
hibits certain damages types.165 In Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach,
Inc., the agreement prohibited an arbitrator from awarding punitive
damages in favor of any party.166 Prohibiting punitive damages was
“oppressive, one-sided, and not geared toward achieving an unbiased
decision by a neutral decision-maker.”167 The unfair provision was
thus unenforceable.168
III. INSTITUTIONAL REACTION
As the cases above demonstrate, courts will invalidate arbitration
agreements in adhesion contracts in the interest of fairness. However,
the circumstances are limited. Further, there is no indication that the
Supreme Court will stop expanding arbitration and limiting consum-
ers’ ability to bring class actions in arbitration. Thus, this Comment
now shifts focus to other entities in the arbitration world—the arbitra-
tion institutions—to consider whether they have reacted to the
Court’s controversial jurisprudence by addressing the minimal protec-
tions available to consumers entering arbitration agreements.
Arbitration institutions administer arbitration proceedings.169
Among other things, they provide parties with specialized rules and
procedures for the parties’ given dispute and with a list of qualified
arbitrators.170 For the sake of convenience and efficiency, an arbitra-
tion agreement often designates a specific arbitration institution and
incorporates that institution’s well-established rules and proce-
dures.171 Although there are several arbitration institutions in the
United States and worldwide, this Comment analyzes the American
Arbitration Association (“AAA”) because it was the first national ar-
bitration institution and is among the most well-known.172
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991)).
164. Id. at 547.
165. See, e.g., Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663 (S.C. 2007).
166. Id. at 671.
167. Id.
168. Id.





172. FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS 29 (1948).
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A. The American Arbitration Association
The AAA formed in 1926, one year after Congress enacted the
FAA.173 The AAA’s goal was to promote arbitration and bring credi-
bility to the arbitral system.174 Because many parties were unfamiliar
with arbitration, the AAA made it more accessible by creating stan-
dardized rules and services, which facilitated parties in forming arbi-
tration agreements and in conducting formal arbitration
proceedings.175 The AAA brought credibility to the arbitral system by
ensuring that its “procedures . . . would be litigation proof” thereby
“eliminat[ing] . . . uncertainties and delays” in the dispute resolution
process.176 Thus, even though arbitration agreements are contracts
and the drafting party is generally free to design the procedures how it
chooses, the AAA rules are attractive because they help ensure that
an arbitration agreement, and its terms, are valid and enforceable.
Due to the AAA’s background and prominence in the arbitral
scene, the AAA has an interest in ensuring that its rules and proce-
dures continue encouraging arbitration and eliminating the dangers of
uncertainty and delay that can permeate the arbitral process. The
AAA does so by closely monitoring court decisions regarding the va-
lidity of arbitration agreements and harmonizing its rules and proce-
dures accordingly.177
This monitoring and harmonizing process is evident in the AAA’s
reactions to instances where courts have held that consumers may in-
validate an arbitration agreement. To ensure its agreements remain
valid, the AAA has promulgated additional rules and procedures to
lessen the fairness issues that might arise in consumer arbitration.
However, these rules neither make consumer arbitration truly fair nor
do they keep it efficient and inexpensive.
B. Due Process Protocol
One of the most significant ways in which the AAA has reacted to
the anti-arbitration and consumer-advocate concerns is through
promulgating a “Due Process Protocol” for consumer arbitrations.178
In its Protocol, the AAA acknowledges that “there are legitimate con-
cerns regarding the fairness of” the dispute resolution procedures that
service providers insert into arbitration agreements.179 Thus, the
173. Id. at 17.
174. Id. at 23–24.
175. Id. at 23.
176. Id. at 24.
177. Andrea Cann Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from
Four Providers, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2019) [hereinafter Arbitration Nation].
178. After the Revolution, supra note 33, at 70.
179. AM. ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL STATEMENT OF PRIN-
CIPLES 4 (1998), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Con-
sumer%20Due%20Process%20Protocol%20(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/3RYM-SR66]
[hereinafter CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL].
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AAA will not administer the arbitration of a consumer contract that
does not “provide for a fair alternative dispute resolution . . . pro-
cess.”180 This rule recognizes the court-held requirement that all arbi-
tration agreements and proceedings meet a minimum level of
fairness.181 In the interest of a fair proceeding, the AAA requires that
an arbitrator be independent, impartial, and neutral.182 To achieve
this, the Protocol states that a consumer and service provider each
have an equal voice in selecting an arbitrator.183 Further, an arbitrator
must disclose any bias he or she might have toward one party.184
While this requirement might help alleviate egregious cases of arbitra-
tor bias, it does not solve the repeat-player issue. Because service
providers are commonly repeat players in arbitration, service provid-
ers likely have more information than the consumer as to which arbi-
trators are more likely to resolve the dispute in their favor.185
The Protocol also states that service providers should structure their
arbitration agreements to ensure that consumers face only a “reasona-
ble cost.”186 This is a reaction to court decisions holding that a party
may invalidate an arbitration agreement if he or she would be finan-
cially burdened by excessive fees.187 Accordingly, in some instances,
the AAA will waive consumer filing fees or require the service pro-
vider to subsidize arbitration costs.188 For example, in consumer arbi-
trations, the consumer must pay a nonrefundable $200 filing fee but is
not required to pay anything if the service provider files the case.189
Further, the business is responsible for the arbitrator’s compensation
at $2,500 per arbitrator, per day.190 Additionally, in certain states,
“consumers with a gross monthly income of less than 300% of the
federal poverty guidelines are entitled to a waiver of arbitration fees
and costs,” notwithstanding any contrary terms in an arbitration
agreement.191 At a glance, these cost-balancing rules appear essential
to balancing inequalities between consumers and service providers.
Indeed, a cap on fees might make arbitration more affordable and
thus fairer for the consumer. However, a consumer still has to pay
certain fees if he or she is the claimant, which could deter a consumer
180. Arbitration Nation, supra note 177, at 15.
181. See Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (1999).
182. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 179, at 1.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See After the Revolution, supra note 33, at 68.
186. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 179, at 17.
187. See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 670 (6th Cir. 2003).
188. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 179, at 17–18.
189. AM. ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES 33–34 (2014), https://
adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer-Rules-Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/KME9-EC4W]
[hereinafter CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES].
190. Id. at 33.
191. Id. at 34–35.
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from suing.192 Even if a service provider is required to pay all costs,
that raises concerns about arbitrator impartiality. While the AAA ac-
knowledges this concern, its solution that consumers “should have the
option to share up to half” the arbitrator’s expenses suggests that con-
sumers must choose between paying possibly excessive costs and hav-
ing a neutral proceeding.193
C. Rules for Consumer Arbitration
The AAA has also reacted to fairness concerns by modifying its
rules and procedures for consumer arbitrations. In the interest of con-
ducting a fair proceeding, an arbitrator may require consumers and
service providers to disclose “specific documents and other informa-
tion” and identify all witnesses.194 The arbitrator has the authority to
resolve any dispute arising from the exchange of information.195 The
AAA rules neither limit the amount of discovery a consumer can con-
duct nor the amount of witnesses a consumer can call.196 This broad
discovery rule is beneficial simply because it allows consumers to col-
lect information about the case they might not obtain otherwise. How-
ever, this rule resembles the FRCP’s broad discovery rules.197 The
AAA acknowledges that this rule could make arbitration significantly
more court-like, warning that in following this rule, the arbitrator
should “keep[] in mind that arbitration must remain a fast and eco-
nomical process.”198 On the other hand, the arbitrator may require the
parties to share more information in the interest of a fair proceeding,
turning arbitration into a long and costly process—the very thing the
AAA warns against.199
The AAA also addressed concerns by creating specific procedures
for class action arbitration. As discussed above, allowing consumers to
proceed as a class enables consumers to arbitrate low-value claims
that would be illogical to arbitrate individually.200 Thus, soon after the
Supreme Court implicitly approved the class action arbitration device
in Bazzle, the AAA enacted its rules for class action arbitrations.201
192. Id. at 33–36.
193. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 179, at 18.
194. CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 189, at 20.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
198. CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 189, at 20.
199. Id.
200. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365–66 (2011) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
201. “On October 8, 2003, in response to the ruling of the United States Supreme
Court in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, the American Arbitration Association
issued its Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations to govern proceedings brought
as class arbitrations.” AM. ARB. ASS’N, AAA POLICY ON CLASS ARBITRATIONS
(2005), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA-Policy-on-
Class-Arbitrations.pdf [https://perma.cc/EVV4-HZCH].
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The class action procedures are designed to supplement other arbitra-
tion procedures, like the consumer ones.202 As the Court highlighted
in Concepcion, the AAA class arbitration procedures are essentially
identical to the class procedures outlined by the FRCP.203 Like the
FRCP, the AAA rules require that the arbitrator first address the
class-certification question.204 Once the class is certified, the arbitrator
must ensure that “class members be provided the best notice practica-
ble under the circumstances.”205 Thus, the confidentiality presumption
that exists in most arbitration proceedings does not apply.206 Other
procedures similar to the FRCP make class arbitration less efficient
and more costly. However, the extensive AAA rules and procedures
required for class action arbitration are essential to conducting a fair
proceeding.207 So while permitting class actions encourages consumers
to bring claims, the device itself is very court-like and loses arbitra-
tion’s intended benefits.
While the Protocol and specific rules for consumer arbitration and
class action arbitration are at least somewhat beneficial for consumers
because they appear to help balance the disparities between consum-
ers and service providers, these rules necessarily contain more safe-
guards and procedures. The extensive rules inevitably make consumer
arbitration appear more and more like litigation. Further, these rules’
inefficiencies might not even be worth the trouble, as the rules do not
appear to make arbitration truly fair for consumers. If the AAA con-
tinues to promulgate more rules in the name of ensuring fairness or
the validity of arbitration agreements, it follows that arbitration pro-
ceedings could become—and in many cases often are—just as long
and costly as litigation. Thus, in an effort to make arbitration fairer,
the AAA and other arbitration institutions are defeating arbitration’s
main purposes.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s expansion of the FAA is concerning for many
anti-arbitration and consumer advocates. These advocates view arbi-
tration as an unfair forum, particularly when consumers are parties to
adhesion contracts or forced to arbitrate their statutory rights. The
anti-arbitration advocates have brought these concerns to courts and,
in many cases, courts have carved out exceptions as to when consumer
202. AM. ARB. ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS 3
(2003), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Supplementary
%20Rules%20for%20Class%20Arbitrations.pdf [https://perma.cc/77NY-NLMR]
[hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS].
203. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 349 (2011) (comparing the
AAA’s SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS with FED. R. CIV. P. 23).
204. SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS, supra note 202, at 4–5.
205. Id. at 6.
206. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011).
207. Id. at 349.
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arbitration contracts could be unenforceable. To maintain arbitra-
tion’s popularity and ensure the validity of arbitration agreements, the
AAA has directly reacted by instituting rules that mandate a mini-
mum level of fairness, cap costs, attempt to ensure arbitrator neutral-
ity, and authorize broad discovery and witness selection. Further, the
AAA has developed specific rules for class action arbitrations, provid-
ing a device for consumers to bring low-value claims (subject to the
Supreme Court’s restrictions).
These rules attempt to make arbitration an equal playing field be-
tween consumers and service providers while attempting to maintain
the informal, efficient nature of arbitration proceedings. However, the
rules are often unsuccessful in balancing the tension between fairness
and efficiency. Despite the AAA’s efforts, their rules are not actually
that impactful. Accordingly, it is likely that anti-arbitration advocates
will demand stronger efforts to make arbitration fair. If institutions
like the AAA continue reacting, arbitration will continue mirroring
litigation in that arbitration will be more expensive, complex, and
inefficient. Thus, in an effort to ensure arbitration agreements’ valid-
ity, which is targeted due to the Supreme Court’s contradictory and
problematic jurisprudence, arbitration institutions are making arbitra-
tion less desirable for both parties.
Therefore, institutional reaction is likely not the way to achieve bal-
ance between fairness and efficiency in the arbitral system. Without
the Supreme Court completely back-tracking its arbitration jurispru-
dence, congressional action could be the only solution. In 2019, the
House of Representatives introduced the Forced Arbitration Injustice
Repeal Act (“FAIR Act”).208 If passed, the FAIR Act would prohibit
pre-dispute arbitration agreements that force consumers to arbitrate
or that interfere with a consumer’s right to bring a class action.209 Al-
though the FAIR Act is no longer before Congress, it would more
appropriately balance fairness and efficiency because it would elimi-
nate the forced arbitration of consumer claims altogether, giving a
consumer the freedom to choose arbitration or litigation.
208. See Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. § 2(2)
(2019).
209. See id.
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